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INTRODUCTION 
While most American academics and policymakers are familiar with the prob- 
lems facing the growing elderly population in the United States, many are sur- 
prised to learn of the troubles confronting the aged in Africa. In stark contrast 
to the mythic image of the tightly-knit extended family, where grandparents are 
lovingly cared for as a respected and integral part of the family unit, is the un- 
forgiving reality of hunger, ill health, and loneliness that is the daily existence 
for many elderly Africans. It is critical that the problems of the aged in Africa 
and other parts of the developing world be examined, but we must recognize 
that these problems do not signify a simple convergence toward a common so- 
cial ill across the globe. Rather, the nature of inter-generational solidarity 
varies, sometimes dramatically, over time and across contexts. This study em- 
ploys a comparative analysis to reveal important differences in the nature of in- 
ter-generational solidarity over time between two similar sub-regions in neigh- 
boring Ghana and CBte d'Ivoire in West Africa, and asks what explains those 
differences. 
The existing literature does not predict this degree of spatial and temporal 
variation precisely because it does not adequately explain the process of social 
change. Theories that emphasize the socio-cultural changes wrought by the 
forces of modernization (Lerner 1958; Almond and Coleman 1960) or global- 
ization (Rodrik 1997; Stiglitz 2002) fail to explain why villages with similar 
levels of industrialization, education, exposure to Western media, and global 
integration display different types of inter-generational solidarity. The wide 
range of arguments about the general impacts of capitalism on "traditional" 
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family systems, cultures, and economies (Marx 1978; Engels 1972; Weber 
1964) cannot explain divergences between the two regions examined here, both 
of which have been integrated similarly into national and international markets 
through massive export production of cocoa for over seventy-five years. Fur- 
thermore, the contrasts in inter-generational solidarity in these two regions do 
not appear to be a result of different state social policies targeted toward the 
young or the old (Schlessinger and Hutchings 2002), since very few public poli- 
cies explicitly target the elderly in either Ghana or CBte d'Ivoire (Morris 
MacLean 2002). 
By comparing the processes of social change in Ghana and CBte d'Ivoire, 
this article reveals the mechanisms through which different histories of state 
agricultural policy have had indirect and unintended consequences on local so- 
cial institutions. More specifically, state agricultural policies have influenced 
the particular ways that local people are able and choose to integrate into local 
and national political economies. Thus, in the 1990s, the exploitative agricul- 
tural policy of the Ghanaian state towards cocoa combined with the lower rel- 
ative cost of labor and recent improvements in transportation to make tomato 
farming more attractive in Ghana than in CBte d'Ivoire. In what follows, I will 
detail how this shift in local-level production has affected the structure of so- 
cial support networks. Due to the new requirements of tomato farming, Ghana- 
ian social support networks have become more diversified, horizontally ori- 
ented, and youthful. Tomatoes are "the empire of the young," and bring 
dramatic new levels of wealth and power to youth. This is in contrast to CBte 
d'Ivoire, where both the young and the old continue to grow cocoa, and social 
support networks are more concentrated and vertically oriented, continuing to 
link youth and elders. The divergent local experiences of agrarian capitalism in 
Ghana and CBte d'Ivoire have changed the ways in which the boundaries of 
family and community are imagined in the two countries-solidarity between 
the young and old has been weakened in Ghana, but reinforced in CBte dYIvoire. 
My analysis is based on over eighteen months of village-level fieldwork in 
two culturally and economically matched sub-regions of Ghana and CGte 
d'1voire.l In this particular area, one large ethnic group with similar pre-colo- 
nial cultural and social structures was split by the FrenchIBritish boundary. Af- 
ter extensive discussions and preliminary site visits, two representative villages 
in each sub-region were selected for study. These four villages were similar in 
their population sizes, agricultural histories, distance from roads and markets, 
and the types of social services available. This research design allowed control 
over many potential explanatory variables such as inheritance patterns, levels 
of wealth, economic development, and social infrastructure. Quantitative and 
Fieldwork was conducted fromApri1 to August 1997, and from October 1998 to October 1999 
in two villages in Tano District in the Brong-Ahafo region of Ghana and in two villages in the Aben- 
gourou region of Cate d'Ivoire. Fictional names are used for these villages to protect the anonymi- 
ty of the sources. 
qualitative methods were combined, including survey research, focus groups, 
in-depth interviews, collection of oral histories, ethnographic observation, and 
archival research. 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
This study contributes in multiple ways to several disparate literatures that sel- 
dom speak to each other: (1) the literature on agrarian capitalism and social sup- 
port networks, emerging largely from the developing world; (2) the compara- 
tive politics literature on the nature of the state and society; and (3) the welfare 
state and social policy literature that focuses predominantly on the advanced in- 
dustrialized democracies (AICs). 
First, this study extends earlier work on the development of agrarian capi- 
talism and its effects on social support networks (Berry 1993; Watts 1983; Hy- 
den 1980; Scott 1976). It demonstrates how particular state economic policies 
have stimulated different types of agrarian capitalism at local levels, trans- 
forming Hyden's "economy of affection" in divergent ways in the two cases. 
The findings also provide an important critique to Berry (1993:8), by demon- 
strating how the nature of incorporation into the colonial and post-colonial state 
and economy are indeed important for the contrasting ways that social relations 
are defined. Furthermore, while Berry (1993; 1997) makes the important point 
that social relations are often contested and negotiated over time, this study 
shows that the fluidity of social relations occurs within the parameters of local 
economic and political power, which are shaped in turn by different patterns of 
state policymaking and local-level production strategies. Hence, not everything 
is negotiable and ambiguous, and some conditions are more "permanent" than 
others. Different patterns of social exclusion not only exist, but can persist, with 
important implications for social welfare and politics. 
Second, the findings presented here counter much of the political science lit- 
erature on the nature of the African state and society, which portrays relatively 
ineffectual states struggling to influence society within their borders (Herbst 
2000; Reno 1998; Chazan 1988; Sandbrook 1985; Hyden 1980). While I do not 
argue that the Ghanaian or Ivoirian states necessarily govern with strength, ef- 
ficacy, legitimacy, or democracy, I do emphasize how state policies and bu- 
reaucratic institutions matter, and how they are experienced by Africans in par- 
ticular ways, even in small villages in the rural hinterlands. The research 
suggests that the African state is neither completely separate from society 
(Chazan 1988), nor wholly permeated by society through the extension of clien- 
telist networks (Villalon 1998; Bayart 1993; Hyden 1980). Attention should be 
paid to how states and societies are not so much dichotomous as they are en- 
tangled and mutually constitutive (Migdal2001; Gupta 1998). Furthermore, the 
study highlights the need to incorporate historicity within scholarly analyses in 
order to reveal the dynamics of change in African states over what Mbembe 
(2001) calls the longue duree. This contribution to current thinking about- the 
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nature of the state and social institutions is not purely theoretical, but has iin- 
portant policy implications. Many of the economic and social policies advo- 
cated by the World Bank (World Bank 1994) and other donors in the develop- 
ing world are predicated on a simplistic conceptualization of the state and 
ungrounded assumptions about the existence of vibrant "informal" social safe- 
ty nets, neither of which appear to function or change as commonly presumed. 
Finally, the study contributes to the analysis of social policy, and in particu- 
lar the problems of the aged, by incorporating evidence from the developing 
world. To date, much of the scholarly and media attention surrounding aging 
populations focuses on issues facing the United States and other AICs. The ini- 
tial work conducted in developing countries has often been restricted to in- 
depth case studies of the problems of the aged, with a goal of documenting the 
need for concerted policy responses (e.g., Apt 1996).2 The present study fo- 
cuses on the process of change, not solely the outcomes, through a cross-na- 
tional comparison which highlights the significant role played by state policies 
outside of the social policy arena. Furthermore, while most studies of welfare 
states examine macro-structural contexts to assess how social policies are de- 
termined in different AICs and over time (Pierson 1996; Esping-Anderson 
1990), the analysis presented here connects the macro- to the micro-context in 
a novel way, investigating how different state policies affect the structure of so- 
cial networks. 
R E C E N T  DIVERGENCE I N  L O C A L  CASH CROP PRODUCTION 
I N  G H A N A  A N D  C ~ T E  D ' I V O I R E  
This section documents a divergence in local-level production strategies in the 
1990s, with tomatoes becoming the new cash crop of the young in Ghana, but 
not in C8te d'Ivoire. 
New Tribulations for the Cocoa Farmer 
Since at least the early 1930s, cocoa has been the main crop grown in the two 
field site regions. Cocoa was first established in Ghana and CBte d'Ivoire in near- 
by regions of the same umbrella Akan ethnic group, but quickly spread to the re- 
search areas. By the 1950s and 1960s, cocoa was so dominant that both regions 
were considered relatively wealthy in each country. Because cocoa is a perma- 
nent tree crop that requires long-term access to a sizable area of land? the in- 
digenous Akan ethnic group, primarily males, dominated cocoa production. 
Despite its association with income support for the elderly in the United States, the literature 
on "social security" (Benda-Beckmann et al. 1988; Hirtz 1995; Midgley and Tracy 1996) is based 
predominantly on developing world case studies and defines the concept quite broadly to include 
all members of society, not exclusively the aged. 
Cocoa trees require approximately five years before they can be harvested for the first time. 
After peaking between five and fifteen years, yields began to decline, and trees need to be replaced 
after thirty years. 
Until the 1970s, cocoa plantations thrived, but in the early 1980s several 
droughts sparked bushfires that destroyed a considerable amount of the forest, 
including many established cocoa farms. These bushfires, combined with 
growing population pressures and logging for export, made it increasingly dif- 
ficult to find suitable semi-forested land to reestablish the lost farms or start 
new ones. The reduction of forested area also generated a climactic change- 
the dry season is now longer and more severe, which has resulted in recurrent 
droughts and bushfires. Meanwhile, the surviving plantations are aging, soil 
fertility is diminishing, and yields are subsequently declining. Due to declining 
yields, migrant agricultural wofkers, typically from the northern regions or Sa- 
helian countries (for example, Burkina Faso) are moving to the newer cocoa ar- 
eas in the two countries, making it difficult to maintain and harvest the re- 
maining cocoa farms. 
A Dramatic Switch to Tomato Farming in Ghana, but not in C6te d'lvoire 
Surprisingly, even though farmers in Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire have faced quite 
similar ecological and economic challenges, they have responded differently 
with divergent crop production strategies. In Ghana many farmers are aban- 
doning cocoa for tomato farming: while in C8te d'Ivoire farmers continue to 
expand their existing cocoa plantations and establish new ones. The situation 
in Ghana constitutes a dramatic shift in local-level production, with far-reach- 
ing implications for social relations. 
Cocoa versus Tomato Production Levels 
First, we need to compare the numbers of farmers and farm plots involved in 
cocoa and tomato production. In Ghana, only a handful of farmers (15 percent) 
grow cocoa on an average of 0.13 plots, while more than twice as many grow 
tomatoes (36 percent) on over twice as much land (0.32 plots). Elderly cocoa 
farmers confirmed that the cocoa farms in the contemporary period were "very, 
very small now" compared to the plantations of the past.5 The mean total co- 
coa production in the Ghanaian villages (US$ 304)6 is significantly below 
tomato production in Ghana ($465), and less than one-third of the mean value 
of cocoa production in CGte d'Ivoire ($932). Self-reports and district-level pro- 
duction data confirm survey results that cocoa production indeed declined dur- 
ing the early 1990s (see Table 1). Not only are more farmers growing tomatoes 
in Ghana, tomatoes have become the primary income source for many more 
Ghanaians than Ivoirians (see Table 2). 
Berry (1997) finds a similar commercializatioi~ of vegetable production, particularly tomatoes, 
in Kumawu, Ashanti region. 
Interview (anonyn~ous) by author, Makwan, Ghana, 7 Apr. 1999. 
The mean total production of cocoa in the Ghanaian villages was slightly higher than toma- 
toes, at $575, but when one large producer (earning over $7,000 annually from cocoa) is taken out 
of the sample, the mean drops to only $304, well below tomatoes. 
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TABLE 1
Decline in Cocoa Prodrlction in Tano District, Ghana 
Season 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 
Production 3,089 1,710 1,223 1,195 1,163 
Source: GOG (1996: 24). 
The mean production of individual tomato farmers is much higher in Ghana 
($465) than in CBte d'Ivoire ($48), and the maximum value of tomato produc- 
tion is nearly ten times higher in Ghana ($7,200) than in CBte dlIvoire ($750). 
The existence of many large producers in Ghana reveals a qualitative change 
in the nature of tomato production there: In the past a few tomato plants were 
typically intercropped among cocoa trees for subsistence purposes; now whole 
plots are dedicated entirely to tomatoes. Also, in Ghana over 70 percent of sur- 
vey respondents reported major changes in and out of tomato production, 
whereas in CBte d'Ivoire there has been almost no change. The volatility in 
Ghanaian tomato production is due to the short growing season (three to four 
months), which facilitates experimentation, and the high risks associated with 
marketing such a perishable crop, which cause huge variation in prices (see 
Table 3.). 
In contrast to these striking changes in Ghana, cocoa remains the single most 
important crop produced in CBte d'Ivoire. Over six times as many farmers (71 
percent) produce cocoa in CBte d'Ivoire as in Ghana, on more land (0.35 plots). 
Some Ivoirian farmers were less confident about the ability of their cocoa plan- 
tations to provide them with security, due to the prevalence of bushfires and 
drought in recent years. Nonetheless, data from surveys and in-depth interviews 
confirms that not only are existing plantations being expanded, but new ones 
are being established. 
A Comparison of the Demographic Profile of Tomato and Cocoa Farmers 
The demographic profile of the farmers producing tomatoes and cocoa is even 
more remarkable. In Ghana, tomato production is the empire of the young. One 
TABLE 2 
Percentage of Fanners Whose Primary Income Source is Cocoa versus Tomatoes 
GHANA C ~ T E  D'IVOIRE 
Primary Income from Cocoa 11 percent 48 percent 
Primary Income from Tomatoes 22 percent 3 percent 
I TABLE 3 
Tomato and Cocoa Producer Prices in Ghana and Cdte d'lvoire* 
I 
I 
Prod~~ce GHANA C ~ T E  D 'IVOIRE 
Tomatoes, $11 box $38-$200 not available 
Cocoa, $/kilo $2.19 $0.95 
I 
I 
*Note: Prices are purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted. 
I 
chief, when describing the agricultural activities of his village, began with 
tomatoes, saying that it was "the main work for the y ~ u t h . " ~  The queen moth- 
er of the second Ghanaian village confirmed this trend, attributing a rise in the 
village's standard of living to the fact that "now, the young men are up and hard- 
working with to ma toe^."^ In informal interviews, older people, in defeated 
tones, also characterized tomatoes as "a young person's crop."g One elderly co- 
coa farmer in Ghana explained how he would farm tomatoes too, "if I had the 
strength and c~uld."'~After a couple of years attempting to farm tomatoes, sev- 
eral Ghanaian farmers in their late forties and early fifties described being ex- 
hausted and unable to continue. They seemed disappointed by their own phys- 
ical limitations as they spoke of the need to shift to a less labor-intensive food 
crop such as cassava. 
Survey results indicate that most tomato producers in Ghana are between 
eighteen and twenty-five years of age, with only three respondents over forty. 
This strikingly young group is also earning much more from their production 
($838) than any other age group. Furthermore, the top three maximum values 
of production between $1,400 and $7,200 were from farmers age eighteen to 
twenty-five. In CBte d'Ivoire, by contrast, tomato producers and their revenues 
are split relatively evenly between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five years, the 
same demographic pattern as is found in cocoa. 
Tomato production in Ghana not only challenges prior social hierarchies 
based on age, but also those based on gender and ethnicity. Whereas indigenous 
males almost exclusively dominated cocoa production in the past, now a sig- 
nificant number of young women and non-Akans have started tomato farms in 
Ghana." Moreover, these new cash crop farmers sometimes matched or out- 
paced their Akan male counterparts in the value of their tomato production. 
In comparison, CBte d'Ivoire farmers include both young and old, women, 
Interview with Nana Amankwah, Barinla, Ghana, 22 Mar. 1999. 
! Interview (anonymous) by author, Makwan, Ghana, 31 Mar. 1999. 
Interviews (anonymous) by author, Barima and Makwan, Ghana. 
4 
lo Interview (anonynlous) by author, Makwan, Ghana, 7 Apr. 1999. 
t " In Ghana, women accounted for 28 percent of all tomato producers whereas non-Akan ac- f counted for 34 percent. 
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and non-Akan. Whereas the mean age of Ghanaian cocoa farmers is sixty-two, 
that of Ivoirian cocoa farmers is forty. Indeed, the largest group of Ivoirian co- 
coa producers are twenty-six to forty years old, relatively youthful compared 
to Ghana where the largest group is those over seventy, including the single 
largest producer. In CBte d'Ivoire, the single largest producer ($12,500) was a 
forty-five-year-old Akan male and the second largest ($9,025) was a twenty- 
year-old Akan male. There is also evidence that several young men are starting 
new farms, and thus cocoa does not at all appear to be on the wane among mem- 
bers of upcoming generations, as is so clearly the case in Ghana. 
While a few farmers are growing tomatoes in CBte d'Ivoire, this remains on 
a very small scale in comparison to farms in Ghana, and, interestingly, the farm- 
ers in Cbte d'Ivoire are almost exclusively young non-Akans, and to a lesser 
extent women, indicating tomatoes' lack of recognized value as a true cash crop 
there. Only 16 percent of non-Akan tomato farmers earn more than $100 in CBte 
d71voire, compared to over 96 percent in Ghana, and in CBte dlIvoire only 4 
percent of female tomato farmers earn more than $100 as compared to over 63 
percent in Ghana. 
The History of Exploitative State Agricultural Policies in Ghana 
So why are Ghanaians switching to tomatoes as a new cash crop while Ivoiri- 
ans are choosing to remain with cocoa? This question is especially perplexing 
in light of the appreciably higher producer prices for cocoa in Ghana compared 
to CBte d'Ivoire (see Table 3). Although an in-depth discussion of this question 
is impossible here, an abbreviated answer is important for what it tells us about 
changing norms of solidarity in the family and community. 
First, Ghanaians are switching to new cash crops, in particular annual veg- 
etables instead of permanent tree crops, because of a long history of exploita- 
tive agricultural policies against cocoa by the Ghanaian state.12 These policies, 
initiated before independence, implicitly taxed cocoa production at a much 
higher rate in Ghana, and this spurred cross-border smuggling when the "real" 
producer price was higher in CBte d'Ivoire.13 These state policies eroded the 
farmer confidence necessary for making long-term investments in cocoa, where 
yields do not usually begin until year five and do not start to peak for another 
decade. 
I2 In 1947, the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) was established in Ghana as a legal monopoly 
to export Ghanaian cocoa. The CMB fixed the local price of cocoa, normally below the world price, 
and, in theory, saved the differential to support price increases when the world price was too low. 
In reality, when the economy deteriorated, the CMB profits were used to cover CMB costs or trans- 
ferred directly to central government coffers (Stryker 1990: 97). See also McMillan and Masters 
(1 999) and Frimpong-Ansah (199 1). 
l 3  In Ghana, cocoa farmers captured only 15-40 percent of the world market price for cocoa, 
whereas Ivoirian farmers received at least 66 percent of the world price (Leechor 1994, 156). 
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In contrast to these antagonistic policies, the Ivoirian state supported the co- 
coa industry, allowing private companies to market cocoa, guaranteeing the 
country a higher share of the world producer price, and facilitating the immi- 
gration of agricultural workers from the northern regions and Sahelian coun- 
tries into CGte d'Ivoire. The Ivoirian state thus encouraged the expansion of co- 
coa as a fundamental pillar of its domestic power base, whereas the Ghanaian 
state exploited it, fearful of the cocoa regions' potential opposition threat. This 
explains why Ghanaian cocoa production dropped from over 560,000 tons in 
1965-approximately 34 percent of the world market-to only 160,000 tons 
by 1983.14 Meanwhile, CBte d'Ivoire has virtually traded places with Ghana as 
a world leader in cocoa production, increasing production from 122,000 during 
the period of 1962-1967 to 580,000 tons in 1985. 
Based on this history of extractive agricultural policies towards cocoa in 
Ghana, one would predict that Ghanaian farmers would resist adopting other 
permanent crops. Thus, this legacy of state exploitation explains why, despite 
"the hard sell" and multiple incentives offered by agricultural extension agents, 
Ghanaians have refused to adopt another permanent crop such as coffee.'' Not 
one Ghanaian farmer reported growing coffee, whereas 43 percent of Ivoirian 
farmers polled in the survey cultivated coffee, with a mean annual value of pro- 
duction of $29 1. 
The Lower Price of Labor in Ghana Relative to Cdte d'lvoire 
While the antagonistic policies of the state do elucidate why Ghanaians may 
have turned away from cocoa and other tree crops, it does not explain why they 
turned toward tomatoes. Another key part of the story is that the relative price 
of labor is much cheaper in Ghana than in CBte d'Ivoire. Unlike cocoa, toma- 
toes do not require large plots of land, but they do call for large inputs of labor. 
Tomato plants must be watered individually every day, a backbreaking task that 
usually begins at 5 a.m.16Also, because tomatoes are not permanent plants, they 
must be replanted after each harvest, three times a year, or every three to four 
months. Cocoa trees, on the other hand, can live for between thirty and fifty 
years. Cocoa also requires minimal labor throughout the year to maintain the 
trees, with only two, predictable peaks of labor during the major and minor har- 
vests. 
Until recently, the Ivoirian government made it quite easy for foreigners from 
l4 After adopting liberalization, Ghanaian cocoa production increased to 247,000 tons by 1990 
but then leveled off (Gyimah-Boadi 1995; Leechor 1994: 156) and never regained its former peak. 
IS Agricultural extension agents in Ghana reported serious resistance to coffee cultivation de- 
spite offers of free fire-resistant seedlings, technical assistance, and favorable producer prices. In 
contrast, agricultural extension agents in CBte d'lvoire noted an increase in coffee production in re- 
cent years. 
l6  Watering must be done early in the field site villages, for two reasons: One, the water source 
closest to the field will be exhausted if you are the last one to arrive. Second, the plants must be 
soaked with water before the sun begins to scorch them. 
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Mali or Burkina Faso to migrate to and work in the cocoa regions. Hence, his- 
torically, Ivoirians have depended on migrant labor to work their plantations 
much more exclusively than have farmers in Ghana, where the government did 
little to facilitate the influx of migrant labor. Now, however, since fires and oth- 
er ecological changes have reduced cocoa yields over time, it has become in- 
creasingly difficult to attract and pay for foreign labor to work on Ivoirian farms 
in the field site region. On the supply side, Burkinabe and other workers prefer 
the newer pioneering cocoa regions in the West, where the same percentage of 
a larger yield earns more money. On the demand side, Ivoirian cocoa farmers 
can no longer afford to hire labor. 
The Ivoirian government aggravated this situation further by shifting tactics 
in the 1990s and making it much more difficult for foreign workers to immi- 
grate and remain legally in the country. The price of identity cards skyrocket- 
ed, and now anyone who looks "foreign" is routinely harassed for their pa- 
pers.17 The government is also pursuing a land registration policy that will 
reappropriate land that had been sold or given to foreigners in the past and give 
title to the "original" indigenous owners. For the above reasons, foreign labor 
is in short supply and Ivoirians have a strong incentive to stick with the less la- 
bor-intensive cocoa production. 
The same dilemma with regard to the scarcity of migrant labor troubles 
Ghanaians, but they appear to have more options. First, Ghanaians never relied 
as heavily on migrant labor, and farmers and their families have always worked 
their own farms, even in the good times. While approximately half of all re- 
spondents in both countries replied affirmatively that they had purchased some 
type of agricultural labor during the previous year, the mean expenditure was 
much higher in Cbte d'Ivoire ($67) than in Ghana ($6). This most likely reflects 
the higher proportion of permanent workers hired in Cbte dlIvoire, as well as 
the higher costs of labor for permanent and daily workers there (see Table 4). 
Second, the Ghanaian economy has experienced more downturns than the 
Ivoirian one, and so Ghanaians have been forced to adapt and be more flexible 
and willing to work in any sector. For example, many more Ghanaians report- 
ed working "by day" if necessary to earn additional income whereas this prac- 
tice was rarely, if ever, acknowledged in Cbte d'Ivoire. Third, the survey re- 
search documented that Ghanaian respondents' children lived closer to their 
parents' homes than do the Ivoirians' children. Thus, due to the greater avail- 
ability of cheaper family labor, Ghanaians are better able to switch to tomato 
farming, with the high daily labor inputs it demands. 
This situation has deteriorated gravely since the time of fieldwork due to recent ethnic civil 
war which has spurred anti-immigrant violence and the subsequent flight of many non-Akans. 
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TABLE 4
Price ofAgricultz~ru1 Labor in Field Sites 
GHANA C ~ T E  D'IVOIRE 
Daily Wage Rate $0.71-$1.66/day $1.20-3.33lday 
Annual Contract Amounts * $100$167/year 
"Missing data. 
Recent Improvements in Transportation Facilitate Tomato Marketing 
in Contemporary Ghana 
While the lower cost of labor explains why Ghanaians were more likely to adopt 
tomatoes than were Ivoirians, recent improvements in transportation in Ghana 
explain why Ghanaians have adopted tomatoes within the past decade, rather 
than earlier. Transportation improvements associated with the adoption of 
structural adjustment have facilitated the transport of more perishable crops like 
tomatoes to domestic markets. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980% trans- 
portation in Ghana was extremely difficult. Roads were in serious disrepair, as 
were the few vehicles plying the routes. Cocoa farmers in general were mini- 
mally affected by these difficulties since cocoa can be stored for long periods 
of time and was usually sold at nearby purchasing centers. Beginning in the 
1980s under Ghana's structural adjustment program, the government began im- 
proving the road infrastructure throughout the country. With an infusion of for- 
eign exchange from World Bank loans, the government was also able to in- 
crease gasoline imports.18 Imported car parts also became more readily 
available, resulting in a marked increase in the number of vehicles circulating 
between markets. These transportation improvements, combined with the avail- 
ability of lower-cost labor and the history of exploitative policies against co- 
coa, have encouraged farmers to drop cocoa in favor of tomato production in 
this region of Ghana. 
THE IMPLICATIONS O F  DRAMATIC CASH CROP CHANGES 
FOR SOCIAL SUPPORT NETWORKS 
Redefining Family and Community Solidarity 
The dramatic switch away from cocoa to tomato production in Ghana has stim- 
ulated a redefinition of family and community solidarity at the local level. First, 
l8 Due to the lack of foreign exchange for imports, gasoline was chronically in short supply, The 
Ghanaian government monopoly on distribution facilitated monopoly rents and costly fuel prices. 
A- 
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because so few Ghanaian farmers maintained, replanted, or expanded their co- 
coa plantations in the field site region after the bushfires that began in 1983, co- 
coa farms no longer promise as viable a future. The high levels of poverty in 
this region were unknown during the heyday of the cocoa boom. As one man 
noted, "Some people live the whole day and can only afford to buy kenkey. We 
have a big problem here. All of our farms have been destroyed. At the time that 
we had our cocoa farms, such things were non-existent."lg Cocoa is no longer 
viewed as the way to become prosperous; now tomatoes are. 
But, this new type of cash crop production has dramatically different impli- 
cations for social relations than did cocoa. As seen above, a new group of 
younger tomato farmers has been able to accumulate wealth relatively rapidly. 
This substantial and rapid increase in the economic power of youth is already 
presenting a challenge to traditional social, economic, and political hierarchies 
where older Akan men with long-term investments in large cocoa plantations 
historically were the wealthy elders of the village. 
It is not only the new dynamics of wealth accumulation that are overturning 
previous power structures. Within this new production system, tomato farmers 
face different sets of input requirements than did cocoa farmers. Tomato farm- 
ers need labor more than they need land, the inverse of cocoa cultivation needs. 
Chart 1 shows how these new needs are altering the incentives to maintain so- 
cial ties with various social groups, thereby stimulating changes in the struc- 
ture of social support networks.20 
These new needs for little land but substantial amounts of labor create in- 
centives to maintain highly diversified social support networks in Ghana, in 
contrast to the more concentrated networks found in CBte d'Ivoire. Further- 
more, the relative costs and benefits of giving and receiving social support to 
an older parent or uncle versus a younger friend have changed in Ghana, but 
not in CBte d71voire. 
The variation in the patterns of social relations between cocoa and tomato 
farmers in Ghana and CBte d'Ivoire is demonstrated by the survey data shown 
in Table 5. First, in both Ghana and CBte d'Ivoire tomato farmers give help to 
people with whom they share a more diverse set of social ties, while cocoa farm- 
ers concentrate their help on nuclear family members, particularly in CBte 
d'I~oire.~l The data also shows that giving to friends is not as important for co- 
l9 Men's focus group (anonymous), Makwan, Ghana, Apr. 1999. 
20 This economistic way of conceptualizing social support networks is based on local-level, in- 
digenous perspectives. While notions of exchange and reciprocity were important components of 
social support in both Ghana and CBte d'Ivoire, this does not mean that other less concrete and less 
tangible costs and benefits do not enter into an individual's analysis, or that this analysis necessar- 
ily takes place consciously. 
21 In order to document actual local-level patterns of social exchange, a survey instrument was 
designed that asked respondents what help they had received and given over the past twelve months. 
While the recall would have been arguably better if the time period had been compressed to only 
the previous week or month, the data would have been extremely uneven across village field sites 
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CHART 1. Linking Production to Social Support Networks 
Different Input Needs for Cash Crop Production 
TOMATOES IN GHANA COCOA IN COTE D'IVOIRE 
NEED FOR LAND Low High 
NEED FOR LABOR High Low 
Different Incentives for Social Ties 
GHANA . COTE D'IVOIRE 
MAINTAIN TIES Low High 
TO ELDERS IN 
NUCLEAR AND 
EXTENDED FAMILY 
EXPAND TIES TO High Low 
MANY, STRONG 
WORKERS 
Structure of Social Support Networks 
GHANA COTE D'IVOIRE 
DENSITY OF TIES Diversified Concentrated 
DIRECTION OF TIES Horizontal among youth Vertical between youth and 
elders 
coa farmers as for tomato farmers, in either Ghana or CBte d'Ivoire. The study 
found that tomato farmers in Ghana continued to give the most significant 
amount of social support to their extended family, but what is obscured is the 
ages and/or specific social relations of those to whom that support is offered. 
For example, the qualitative data suggests that the young tomato farmers in 
due to seasonality bias. To improve respondent recall, respondents were reminded of various sea- 
sonal events beginning twelve months prior to the interview. Also, after an initial open-ended ques- 
tion, respondents were asked about seventeen different types of help including: help to pay for hos- 
pital or clinic fees; help to pay for medicine; help to receive care from a traditional healer or 
herbalist; help with the costs of a funeral; help to get engaged or manied; help to pay school fees; 
help to provide school books or supplies; help to provide accommodation; help with food or pre- 
pared meals; help with cloth, clothing, or shoes; help with tools; help by working for someone with- 
out pay; help with land; help in paying a debt; help in starting a business; and, lastly, help with any- 
thing else not already mentioned. While social networks are, of course, not reducible to monetary 
exchanges, transfers of cash or in-kind value are believed to be leading indicators of the depth and 
extent of these networks. Respondents were asked for the particular social tie to which or from 
which they gave or received help. I then aggregated these particular ties into broader categories 
such as nuclear or extended family. 
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TABLE 5 
Social Support Given to Various Social Ties from Cocoa Versus Tomato Farmers 
PRIMARY SOURCE GHANA CSTE D 'IVOIRE 
OF AGRICULTURAL MEAN VALUE OF HELP MEAN VALUE OF HELP 
INCOME GIVEN IN US.$ GIVEN IN US.$ 
COCOA n = 21 n = 95 
help to nuclear = 4.39 help to nuclear = 117.67 
help to extended = 7.43 help to extended = 40.22 
help to friends = 1.41 help to friends = 3.90 
TOMATOES n = 41 n = 5  
help to nuclear = 1.68 help to nuclear = 3.61 
help to extended = 16.21 help to extended = 5.32 
help to friends = 3.84 help to friends = 4.5 1 
Ghana most likely give more support to their younger siblings and cousins than 
to their elderly uncles. 
A Diminished Need for Land in Ghana and Its Implications 
for Social Networks 
Because these younger Ghanaian tomato farmers do not need land as much as 
labor, inheriting the cocoa plantation of one's father and/or uncle had become 
less material than maintaining a wide network of family, friends, and others. 
Since only a small plot of land is required for to ma toe^?^ and for only a short 
period of time, there was no need to invest heavily in one or two particular re- 
lationships, a parent or uncle for example. A farmer could borrow or rent the 
land from anyone rather than inheriting or obtaining the consent of elders for 
the long-term customary use of family land. Thus, because family land has be- 
come relatively less important economically, the incentives for maintaining 
particular social ties have also become less compelling. 
Then, in a positive feedback loop, the fact that fewer young farmers are us- 
ing family land in Ghana further weakens traditional social support networks. 
When a person does use family land to establish a cocoa plantation, their in- 
corporation into social support networks becomes tighter and more obligatory. 
Family land is usually not given or sold but rather entrusted to family members 
"to take care of" for relatively long periods of time. Because cocoa production 
usually occurs on family land, the revenues are perceived as less "autonomous" 
and more closely tied to family welfare. Thus, a wealthy relative who refuses 
to help a needy family member can be questioned and held accountable if his 
22 Data collected at the district level in Ghana confirms that the average cocoa farm is now 3.6 
acres, whereas the average farm size for vegetable crops is only 0.5 acres. 
wealth was gained through family property, as is often the case with cocoa. "He 
can even be sacked for another person to be put in charge of the cocoa farm."23 
On the other hand, if his wealth was acquired through his own means, particu- 
larly on non-family land, as is usually the case with tomatoes, "nothing can be 
done to him."24 
In addition to land, tomato farming does require a certain amount of inputs 
for pesticides, spraying machines, and other tools. Again, this financial assis- 
tance need not be provided by a family member but could be given by anyone 
as a loan or as an investment in exchange for a share of the crop returns. In fact, 
it appears that this sort of assistance is frequently given in conjunction with the 
needed land as part of sharecropping arrangements. 
The survey research confirms these predicted differences in land tenure pat- 
terns in tomato versus cocoa production in Ghana and CGte d'Ivoire. While co- 
coa farmers in Ghana exclusively used either their own property (63 percent) 
or fanlily land (37 percent), the majority of tomato farmers either made share- 
cropping arrangements (38 percent) or rented land (15 percent). While a sub- 
stantial proportion of tomato farmers did use family land (38 percent), only a 
small minority used their own property (9 percent). In comparison, in C8te 
d'Ivoire the overwhelming majority of farmers grew tomatoes on family land 
(48 percent) or on their own property (38 percent), and only 15 percent rented 
or made sharecropping arrangements. These tenure patterns also confirm the 
earlier finding that tomatoes are being cultivated as a cash crop in Ghana, but 
not in CGte d'Ivoire. 
A comparative analysis of land tenure patterns disaggregated by age group 
shows how the use of family land has declined in importance for younger farm- 
ers in Ghana, who are now primarily involved in tomato production. Younger 
farmers in CBte d'hoire, on the other hand, remained actively engaged in co- 
coa production. In Ghana, at least as many, if not more younger tomato farm- 
ers rented land or sharecropped instead of using family land, while middle-aged 
tomato farmers more exclusively sharecropped, and older farmers did not grow 
tomatoes at all. In Ghana, older cocoa farmers tended to own their plots where- 
as the use of family land was most important to the few, younger cocoa farm- 
ers. This general trend holds true in C8te d'Ivoire as well, although sharecrop- 
ping was more important for younger cocoa farmers. This distinction reflects 
the greater role of migrant labor in cocoa production in CGte d ' I v ~ i r e . ~ ~  The 
changing relative importance of land as an input in tomato production is one 
23 Women's focus group (anonymous), tape recording. Barima, Ghana, Mar. 1999. 
24 Men's focus group (anonymous), tape recording. Barima, Ghana, Mar. 1999. 
25 Migrants represent 52 percent of those farmers who gain their primary income from cocoa 
production in CBte d'Ivoire. The dominant land tenure pattern for those non-Akan cocoa farmers 
is sharecropping (56 percent sharecrop; 31 percent own the land; 10 percent use family land; and 
3 percent use land at no charge). The idea that migrant workers might constitute a significant pro- 
portion of the young sharecroppers is supported by the survey data. Younger non-Akan cocoa farm- 
ers tend to sharecrop, while older ones tend to own their land. 
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reason that informal social networks in Ghana are relatively shallow but more 
diversified than in CGte d'Ivoire. It also begins to reveal why networks are more 
horizontally oriented (linking similar age cohorts) in Ghana and more vertical- 
ly oriented (connecting youth to elders) in Cbte d'Ivoire. If the need for land 
under the new system of tomato production is diminished and can be satisfied 
through a multiplicity of social ties, the former power of nuclear and extended 
family member elders over youth is eroded. 
The Role of Inheritance Laws 
While inheritance laws have also changed over,time, I argue that the reorienta- 
tion of social networks is primarily due to the shift in local-level production 
strategies, not to changes in official legal frameworks affecting inheritance. In 
both Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire, legislation has been passed to encourage a more 
patrilineal inheritance system.26 In CGte d'Ivoire, legislation that designates the 
spouse and children as the sole inheritors was enacted much earlier, in 1964. 
Later, in 1985, the Ghanaian government introduced the Intestate Succession 
Law, which promotes the security of widows and children but also specifies that 
one third of the estate be given to the extended family. 
One might predict that both laws would encourage more nucleated social net- 
works, particularly in CGte d'Ivoire where allocation to the extended family is 
not specified. While both laws do appear to provide some support for the rights 
of the nuclear family, neither is consistently enforced at the local level. When 
asked if children inherit from their father, one Ivoirian woman replied skepti- 
cally, "Here, one talks about it like that, but really.. . those who inherit are one 
here, one there."27 Families are seeking the application of the law and shaping 
their own "customs" on a case-by-case basis. Since there is no commonly held 
expectation of a consistent enforcement of the statutory law to benefit the nu- 
clear family, there is little evidence that these official legislative changes are 
the primary causal factors shaping variations in social support networks. 
Two puzzles remain which are not adequately explained by the changes in 
legal frameworks but are better explained by changes in production. First, why 
would the extended-family system appear to be relatively vibrant in CGte 
d'Ivoire even forty years after the passage of a nuclear family-oriented law? 
The data reveals that that the continued viability of cocoa production at the lo- 
cal level in CGte d'Ivoire strengthens the incentives of young Ivoirian farmers 
to maintain ties with their extended families, whereas in Ghana the system of 
tomato production erodes these incentives. Second, if legislation potentially 
strengthens the role of the nuclear family in both cases, why do friends appear 
26 Both laws potentially conflict with the matrilineal system of the indigenous Akan, the domi- 
nant ethnic group in both field site regions. Historically, in Akan areas, when a man died the man's 
relatives on his mother's side claimed rights to his property, often leaving his wife and children 
homeless and destitute. 
27 Women's focus group (anonymous), Opanin, CBte d'Ivoire, Sept. 1999. 
to be so important in Ghana but not in C6te d'Ivoire? The answer is that the 
need for less land and more labor to grow tomatoes in Ghana fosters a more di- 
versified social support network such that the role of friends is expanded. 
A Greater Need for Labor and the Implications for Social Networks 
The shift to tomato farming in Ghana has not only reduced the demand for larg- 
er plots of land, but has also increased the need for labor. The demand for la- 
bor is not generic, however. Because the work on tomato farms is back-break- 
ing, those who can be of genuine help are younger, more active, and physically 
fit. One Ghanaian man, in discussing the rise of tomato farming in his village, 
asserted that, "Strong people do it . . . very strong. It's difficult Thus, 
it is the younger and stronger men and women who help each other with wa- 
tering and weeding. Younger men and women may lend a hand during the har- 
vest, or money to help another young person plant. Respondents of all ages con- 
firm that the young tomato farmers in Ghana are now becoming an increasingly 
common source of loans for local people.29 This overturns traditional hierar- 
chies where elderly cocoa farmers historically provided loans. One eighty-five- 
year-old cocoa farmer said despondently that, "In the past, I could help anyone, 
even to the extent of borrowing on their behalf. . . . Now, nobody would even 
come. . . . I can't help anyone now."30 Increasingly, young tomato farmers also 
appear to be the recipients of loans given by local people, since they are per- 
ceived as capable of repaying the loans after their tomatoes are sold.31 
We can hypothesize that in Ghana social networks are based increasingly on 
horizontal ties among family members and friends of the same age cohort. Un- 
fortunately, because the survey questionnaire did not ask directly the age of the 
donors and recipients of social support described by respondents, it is impossi- 
ble to test definitively with this data set whether social support networks are 
denser among members of the same age cohort. Other quantitative indicators, 
however, suggest that networks are more horizontal in Ghana than in CBte 
d'Ivoire. Table 6 demonstrates how siblings are a particularIy important social 
category for help in Ghana, whereas giving to parents, grandparents, aunts, and 
uncles is not as substantial there as in CGte d'Ivoire. Ghanaian respondents also 
tend to allocate a greater percentage of their total help to friends and others than 
do Ivoirian respondents. Particularly when one takes account of the cultural em- 
phasis placed on age hierarchies, it is more likely that a respondent's friends 
would belong to approximately the same age group than not. 
Z8 Interview (anonymous) by author, Barima, Ghana, 21 Feb., 1999. 
29 Survey interview (anonymous) by author, Barima, Ghana. Interview (anonymous) by author, 
Makwan, Ghana, 9 Apr., 1999. 
30 Survey interview (anonymous) by author, Makwan, Ghana. 
3L Women's focus group (anonymous), Barima, Ghana, Mar. 1999. 
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TABLE 6 
Social Support Given to Vurious Social Ties by All Responclents 
GHANA C ~ T E  D'IVOIRE 
PERCENT OF PERCENT OF 
TOTAL HELP TOTAL HELP 
MEAN TO MEAN TO 
SOCIAL TOTAL PARTICULAR SOCIAL TOTAL PARTICULAR 
CATEGORY VALUE ($) GROUP CATEGORY VALUE ($) GROUP 
All social ties 28.91 - All social ties 117.5 - 
Nuclear family 13.37 46 percent Nuclear family 81.51 69 percent 
Extended family 10.24 35 percent Extended family 28.09 24 percent 
Parents 0.80 3 percent Parents 5.24 5 percent 
Siblings 4.86 17 percent Siblings 13.04 11 percent 
3.74 13 percent Friends 4.30 4 percent Friends 
Others 1.56 5 percent All social ties 117.5 - b 
I 
INTER-GENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY I N  CRISIS 
Given the difficulties in proving indisputably that social networks are denser 
among those of the same age cohort, due to the limitations of the data, I would 
like to compare the predicted effects of different patterns of social networks on 
inter-generational solidarity. If social networks do diverge in the ways I have 
suggested, one would predict that solidarity between the young and the old 
would be under more serious strain in Ghana than in CGte d'Ivoire. The fol- 
lowing four points provide qualitative evidence to support this prediction, that . 
treatment of the elderly has indeed worsened more gravely and rapidly in Ghana 
than in CGte d'Ivoire. 
The Characterization of Inter-Generational Solidarity by Youth 
First, let us compare how the youth and elderly in Ghana and CGte dlIvoire 
themselves characterize the nature of inter-generational solidarity. While both 
the older and younger individuals were interviewed, the comments from the 
youth were particularly insightful. The elderly in both countries tended to com- 
plain about a lack of respect and the inadequacy of the care they received, 
whereas the opinions expressed by youth in Ghana and youth in CGte d'Ivoire 
were quite different regarding how the elderly were treated and why. I assert 
that the discontented comments from the elderly in both countries reflect their 
long-term expectations having been frustrated by the current economic crisis. 
They likely took care of their own parents during the boom times, and thus their 
expectations of their own futures developed accordingly. 
In Ghana, a young Akan man explained perceptively how the new system of 
tomato farming had inverted traditional hierarchies, resulting in a lack of re- 
spect for the elderly among self-sufficient youth. 
The town is even sinking . . . The youth do not respect the elders . . . [Morris MacLean 
queries: "Why don't they respect them?"] The youth say, "I'mcaring for my own so they 
can't tell me what to do." It's because the aged can't afford for the young. The only job 
we do is tomatoes. The aged are sitting in the house and can't go to farm. So the young 
have money, and the old do not. They can't respect the old man because he doesn't have 
any money . . . This is a sickness to all Ghanaians. . .There has been a problem with re- 
specting the elders for a long time, even since 1900, say, but now it's growing bigger 
and bigger. Now, maybe it's 80 percent who don't respect the elders . . . But, the older 
ones have done something for the younger ones. They bathed us and did everything for 
us. We should be giving them things. It's not a good thing that the young don't respect 
them. This is how God said we should do [respect our elders].32 
In the comments of this young man and others, it seemed clear that this was not 
a totally new problem, yet, the problem has been significantly aggravated by 
recent economic changes, in particular those in the local system of cash crop 
production. The above comments also reveal that the changes in Ghana are not 
trouble-free for anyone: while the elderly are despairing or resentful, the youth 
often express guilt. 
In contrast, in CGte d'Ivoire, because cocoa production still promises the pos- 
sibility of a prosperous future, young people have an incentive to maintain their 
relationships with their elders, and in particular to stay well-connected to their 
parents and uncles from whom they could inherit sizeable cocoa plantations. As 
one young Akan man boasted, " . . . when I inherited from my uncle, ask any- 
one here, what didn't I have as far as plantations go?'33 A young Akan woman 
summarized this idea of continuing reciprocity between youth and elders: "If 
the elderly person has well-off children, then these children will take good care 
of him and send him money at the end of every month. This happens only if 
you worked hard in your This long-term reciprocity seems to be con- 
sidered "normal" to both the young and the elderly in CGte d'Ivoire. One el- 
derly Akan woman used a proverb to explain the ongoing cycle of help: "I raised 
my children from when their teeth first came in. They also, can help me until 
my teeth fall 
Because of the continuing relevance of the matrilineal system, discussed 
above in regards to inheritance, parents are not the only significant figures to 
the young-maternal uncles are important too. Their continued importance in 
CGte d'Ivoire is exemplified by the comments of one nephew who lamented the 
hard times brought on by the death of his own uncle: "My uncle was everything 
for me; he was the one taking care of me." Many more respondents in CGte 
32 Interview with church and leader (anonymous), Barima, Ghana, 24 Feb. 1999. 
33 Men's focus group (anonymous), Opanin, CBte d91voire, Sept. 1999. 
34 Survey interview with a twenty-three-year-old manied Akan woman who had one child, 
(anonymous) by author, Opanin, CBte d'Ivoire. 
35 Interview with elderly woman (anonymous) by author, Kyere, CBte d'Ivoire, 20Aug. 1999. 
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d'Ivoire than in Ghana mention uncles as important sources and outlets for help, 
often citing them before or even without reference to fathers. Many respondents 
described fulfilling their duties as an uncle in terms of supporting or fostering 
their nephews and nieces. For example: "It's me that always takes care of the 
children of my sisters. When I inherited, I took care of the children like I should 
do. I did it without a second Ironically, despite long-established leg- 
islation in CGte d'Ivoire that is unambiguously supportive of a father's children, 
uncles and nephews appear to remain more important there than in Ghana. This 
enduring relevance of uncles not only concentrates network ties within ex- 
tended families, as discussed earlier, but it also strengthens inter-generational 
ties between youth and elders. 
Caretaking of the Elderly in Practice: A Comparison 
Having examined how Ghanaians and Ivoirians generally characterize relations 
between youth and elders, now we will compare how the two groups actually 
behave vis-8-vis the elderly in their own family. First, fewer people in Ghana 
(27 percent) described taking care of an elderly person in comparison to CGte 
d'Ivoire (52 percent). One elderly mother of seven children in Ghana described 
how life was "always" hard because: "No one is taking care of me. I have to 
take care of myself so I'm always in hardship."37 Many respondents in Ghana 
appeared to be working under the assumptio~l that the elderly would be self-re- 
liant, but noted that this self-reliance had been undermined with the marginal- 
ization of the elders' cocoa farms. One thirty-three-year-old Akan man in Ghana 
explained, "Formerly, the elderly didn't need anyone to care for them since they 
had their own cocoa farms. But with the destruction of all of these cocoa farms, 
they, just like the young ones, had to do their own petty farming to care for 
them~elves."~~ Thus the decline of cocoa production in this region of Ghana 
had in a sense leveled the playing field between young and old, but the old were 
less prepared to play the new game in town: tomato farming. 
In comparison, respondents in CGte d'Ivoire did not emphasize the self-re- 
liance of the elderly as Ghanaians frequently did. Children still articulated a re- 
sponsibility to take care of their mothers and fathers, in collaboration with their 
siblings. Respondents frequently opined that children should care for their 
"own" parents and that the village would not take up this resp~nsibili ty.~~ "The 
old man who put you in the world, you can't drop him and it's not the neigh- 
bors either who are going to leave their elderly to take care of yours while you 
are there. It is you or your brothers who can take care of the old man in your 
house."40 
36 Men's focus group (anonymous), tape recording, Opanin, CBte d'Ivoire, Sept. 1999. 
37 Survey interview (anonymous) by author, Barima, Ghana. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Men's and women's focus groups (anonymous), tape recordings, Kyere, CBte d'Ivoire, Aug. 
1999. 
40 Men's focus group (anonymous), Kyere, CBte d'Ivoire, Aug. 1999. 
SOCIAL SUPPORT NETWORKS IN GHANA A N D  C ~ T E  D'IVOIRE 489 
A continued concern for the elderly is confirmed by focus-group discussions 
where participants described how one "must help" an elderly person. "If he 
needs help, it is necessary to give him care, give him something to eat. If he 
can't get up, one can even bathe him and wash him."41 Although there were ex- 
ceptions, in general Ivoirians responded by describing how one cares for the el- 
derly in their family, not whether one should. 
Changes in Meal Preparation for the Elderly 
There are substantial differences, between the preparation of meals for the el- 
derly in Ghana and CBte d'Ivoire, a dissimilarity directly connected to the new 
system of tomato production found in Ghana but not in CGte d'Ivoire. In Ghana, 
most of the elderly and children buy at least one of their meals from the many 
prepared food sellers that line the main street and spread throughout the village. 
Since everyone is needed on the tomato farms very early to water, no one stays 
behind to cook for the family compound as was done in the past. One elderly 
man described how household eating patterns in Ghana had changed and the 
negative impact this had on the elderly: 
In the past, the children of the elderly were there, and the nephews were around so they 
didn't allow the elderly to work. They gave them food and everything. For example, my 
father was in Ohia and since they didn't buy their food, if the old man wanted to eat ten 
times a day, it was no problem. Foodstuffs were in abundance, bush meat was all around, 
and there was livestock too; one only had to buy salt. Whatever the old man wanted, 
they could provide easily. Even oil, like palm oil, they made at home, so they always 
had plenty. It's not this way today. The elderly are not looked after as they were before. 
Now, they go and take the bowl and buy food. The old man even has to send for food. 
If you are elderly and yon were irresponsible and didn't take care of your children, then 
you will definitely go hungry. But if you were responsible, then, they will buy food for 
you . . . Now the women are also working so they buy something and then go straight 
to work. . . We buy a lot more of our food now than we used to. We've always had farms, 
but now they're doing it for the money. They're cultivating tomatoes now and you have 
to work very hard to earn a lot of money, to get good yields. 42 
Another Ghanaian man with a tomato farm said that he and his wife needed to 
go out early to water the tomatoes, and so their children were sent with 100 or 
200 cedis each to buy kenkey or something else to eat. He rationalized that if 
his wife were to stay and cook for the whole family, she would be delayed un- 
til 10 a.m. or so. "In the olden days, we may have sent the kids to the extended 
family, but now, we can't. They may have their own problems and burdens and 
not see them as deserving. They may see it as 'stealing' even!"43 
In C6te d'Ivoire, by comparison, fewer elderly and children purchased their 
morning meals. This was evidenced by the smaller number of prepared food 
sellers there. While a plethora of food sellers lined the main thoroughfare and 
41 Women's focus group (anonymous), Kyere, CBte d'Ivoire, Aug. 1999. 
42 Interview with seventy-four-year-old man (anonymous) by author, Barima, Ghana, 4 Mar. 
1999. 
43 Interview with man in his late fifties (anonymous) by author, Barima, Ghana, 21 Feb. 1999. 
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dotted the courtyards all around the Ghanaian villages, in each of the Ivoirian 
villages there were perhaps three "beignet" and other sellers at the village mar- 
ket, and one or at most two "chop" houses. And the differences were not only 
quantitative-the Ghanaian sellers also tended to prepare more substantial 
"meals" (i.e., staple dishes such as kenkey, foufou, and banku with accompa- 
nying soups) rather than "snacks" (i.e., fried dough, plantain, or yam). Those 
few who did buy food in CBte d'Ivoire appeared to do so because their parents 
or caretakers had to leave early to walk to distant cocoa farms, not to water 
tomato plants. 
Changes in Accommodation of the Elderly 
Changes in the architectural design of homes suggest a more marked decline in 
the accommodation and daily supervision of the elderly in Ghana than in CBte 
d'Ivoire. In Ghana, a greater number of smaller, rectangular homes without the 
more 'traditional' courtyard are being constructed on the outskirts of the village 
center, primarily by younger Akan men with extended families in town. Inter- 
estingly, the changes in architecture toward smaller, nuclear family houses are 
both an indicator of current changes in family relations and a catalyst for fur- 
ther change along the same lines. First, smaller houses do not facilitate cook- 
ing together, which hinders the pooling of resources and the monitoring of food 
intake by elderly family members. One elderly man describes how the archi- 
tectural changes intertwine with the preparation of food and care for young and 
old family members: "Formerly, there were more people than what you see to- 
day in one compound. There might be an old man like myself, children, grand- 
children, and nephews. I knew this, so I built this big family house back in 1950. 
In the olden days, we used to have BIG pots in which we cooked all the food 
for everyone. We may have had two mortars for foufou and all cooked togeth- 
er. Nowadays, each person is building his own house for his smaller family. 
Now, we're separating into separate, smaller houses and so food is not done to- 
gether. Everyone is ~eparating."~" Second, the more restricted allotment of 
space in the smaller houses does not as easily allow for extended overnight vis- 
its, as is usually the custom during ceremonies such as funerals. Lastly, the sep- 
arate and usually less-central locations of the smaller homes impede the super- 
vision and attentive care of elderly family members. 
The social implications of these changes in architecture are not lost on 
Ghanaians. The construction of such a house by an individual seems to be 
viewed both positively and negatively, as an assertion of economic power and 
independence. Several people pointed proudly to half-completed walls, noting 
that when able to buy more materials they would continue building their small 
house for the security of their wife and children. Other, older family members 
44 Interview with seventy-four-year-old man (anonymous) by author, Barima, Ghana, 4 Mar. 
1999. 
would note desolately that one of their younger relatives had abandoned the 
family compound to build their own smaller house. 
In CBte d71voire, by contrast, there appear to be fewer smaller houses, par- 
ticularly among the indigenous Akan.45 The styles of large family houses in this 
region of CBte d'Ivoire were more varied, however, being of three basic types: 
(1) the older style of large rectangular house with many rooms opening onto an 
open-air central courtyard (the type found more exclusively in Ghana); (2) a 
newer style of "villa" with several rooms opening onto an enclosed living room 
area; and (3) the most recent "motel-style" house with two or three long blocks 
of rooms, usually arranged in an "L" or horseshoe shape, looking out onto a 
larger open area. 
Based on respondent accounts of local history, it appears that the few "tradi- 
tional" courtyards remaining were constructed many decades ago. During the 
cocoa boom times most were replaced with villas, which are now frequently in 
a state of disrepair due to the recent hard times. Houses built within the past 
decade follow the third style. Since all of the rooms are not under the same 
square roof, this "motel-style" seems to be a relatively simple and less expen- 
sive model of construction. This style more readily facilitates piecemeal build- 
ing as individuals are able to finance the necessary materials, and need to 
accommodate growing families.46 All three types of houses can and do ac- 
commodate relatively large or multiple households, and all three are referred to 
as family compounds. 
While all of the family house styles in CBte d'Ivoire shared one central, out- 
door kitchen area, cooking was not necessarily as communal as in the past. 
Sometimes multiple households would pool resources and cook "in one big 
pot," and at other times each household cooked with their own ingredients in 
their own pots. Still, the centralization of cooking facilitated a greater sharing 
of resources and information about each other's food security than when peo- 
ple lived in completely separate, nucleated houses, as was more often the case 
in Ghana. We can see this evolution of architectural styles as representing adap- 
tations to changing needs, and as allowing the family compound to persist in 
the face of mounting pressures. 
Before concluding this section, a few caveats must be presented in each case. 
First, in Ghana, while the shift in local-level cash crop production and social 
relations has been dramatic, it remains in process. Solidarities are being strained 
and renegotiated but they are not completely reconstructed. Not all young toma- 
to farmers are able to forfeit all social ties to their elders, particularly in light 
45 In the sections of the village where northern migrant families lived, there were many small- 
er homes. This usually reflected the lack of extended family members for most recent migrants. In- 
terestingly, the second- and third-generation migrant families often had constructed large family 
compounds in the local Akan style. 
46 Frequently families with older villas have added at least one "motel" block to the back or side 
to house mamed children, nieces and nephews, or adult siblings. 
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of the volatility of the market, and not all older cocoa farmers are utterly bereft 
of financial security. Furthermore, these solidarities will continue to change 
over time with changes in the life course of the participants. This study begs an 
important question: what will these young "emperors" do when they grow old 
and can no longer farm tomatoes? Although difficult to assess at this early stage, 
there was little evidence of any efforts by youth to accumulate any kind of pri- 
vate savings for an "individually secured retirement." 
Second, in CBte d'Ivoire, even though cocoa is still relatively more prosper- 
ous, leaving vertical social linkages between the young and old relatively 
strong, social support networks in general are under strain as a result of eco- 
nomic crisis. Not every elderly parent or uncle in C8te d'Ivoire is well cared 
for by children or nephews. Even though incentives to look after elderly par- 
ents and uncles remain in place, young people often lack the means to follow 
through. A middle-aged woman emphasized that it was not a lack of volition 
but rather a lack of means that hindered the care of the elderly: "Because it's 
difficult, what one wants to give them, one doesn't earn. Because our farm pro- 
duce isn't bought at a good price, our means are not sufficient to take care of 
the elderly."47 Nevertheless, the fact remains that a greater number of Ivoirians 
than Ghanaians report caring for an elderly person. Furthermore, in CBte 
d'Ivoire this role is more often described in a nurturing and positive way than 
in Ghana. 
CONCLUSION 
This article presents evidence that the dramatic shift away from cocoa to toma- 
toes as a cash crop in Ghana has redefined the boundaries of solidarity. The de- 
clining relative importance of land and the growing need for labor has resulted 
in new sets of incentives and has consequently reshaped social support net- 
works in two important ways. First, Ghanaians in this region tend to give so- 
cial support to persons with whom they share a wider range of social ties than 
do Ivoirians. Second, social ties in Ghana appear to be denser among family, 
friends, and others of the same age cohort than those in CBte d'Ivoire. We have 
seen how these more diversified and horizontally oriented social networks 
weaken the basis for long-term reciprocity between the young and old. 
By contrast, with the continued emphasis on cocoa production in C8te 
d'Ivoire inter-generational solidarity between the young and the old remains 
relatively strong. Ivoirians tend to give to a more concentrated group of social 
ties, and this support appears to link rather than segregate different age groups. 
While the economic crisis obviously constrains the support given to the elderly 
in both countries, the study demonstrates how different systems of economic 
production can alter the dynamics of elderly care, in this case providing incen- 
tives for elderly care in C6te d'Ivoire and disincentives for the same in Ghana. 
47 Survey interview (anonymous) by author, Opanin, CBte d'Ivoire. 
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So, what are the broader implications of these findings? First, state policies 
do actually influence African societies. We have seen how even state policies 
outside of the social sector, such as in agriculture, can have profound, indirect 
impacts on social relations and social support networks by shaping local sys- 
tems of production. Berry (1993) makes a valuable contribution by demon- 
strating the different ways in which various types of farmers have gained ac- 
cess to productive resources through social networks, but she underestimates 
the potentially transformative effects of colonial and post-colonial state power. 
In the present case we find that the history of more exploitative agricultural 
policies towards cocoa in Ghana has facilitated a shift to tomato production, 
overturning prior local hierarchies of social, economic, and political power and 
spurring a redefinition of the boundaries of community. Meanwhile, these 
boundaries have so far proved relatively "sticky" in C8te d'Ivoire, where co- 
coa production continues to prosper based on the continuation of more sup- 
portive state policies toward permanent tree crops. The renegotiation of social 
networks is occurring in fits and starts, not in the constant, ongoing manner that 
Berry describes. We have also seen that these social-structural changes are not 
seamless or painless; the fluidity of social institutions comes at a cost because 
at new junctures some actors are more or less able to take advantage of oppor- 
tunities created by state policies. Finally, state and donor policies based on the 
assumption of a more comprehensive "informal" social safety net need to be 
informed by particular local social contexts at particular points in time, and re- 
designed accordingly. 
This study has also highlighted the risks and pain involved in renegotiating 
economic livelihoods. Though responding to the same price signals, some 
Ghanaian tomato farmers have rapidly become wealthy while others have lost 
their shirts. Consequently, as more farmers in the area try to win the same toma- 
to "lottery," prices fall further. Hence, the long-term sustainability of expand- 
ed tomato production is doubtful unless the tomatoes can be canned, or trans- 
ported "fresh" to international markets.48 To see these local shifts in economic 
production as simply responses by rational African farmers to changing prices 
prevents us from comprehending the real desperation felt by many farmers, 
both young and old, as they abandon the relatively more stable, albeit less prof- 
itable, production of cocoa. Such a perspective also occludes broader political 
factors-market prices and incentives are not simply generated by a "neutral" 
market, but by a market constructed, regulated, and re-regulated by the state in 
Ghana and in CBte d'Ivoire. 
With these factors in mind, we can predict that Ghanaian farmers will be re- 
's Tomato canning has been attempted in the past but with little success to date. This is ironic 
given the number of imported tomato paste cans that are purchased and used to cook local dishes. 
One obstacle to cost-effective local canning is that only extremely small quantities are desired for 
purchase in the local market due to the liquidity constraints of most households (Gracia Clark, per- 
sonal communication, Nov. 2003). 
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luctant to make long-term investments in agriculture. This hypothesis is sup- 
ported by the fact that Ghanaian farmers do not appear to be investing in irri- 
gation systems, despite the enormous inputs of labor required to water tomato 
plants. Furthermore, even though water is becoming relatively scarce, there is 
no evidence of local-level initiatives to regulate its access and use. This is of 
particular interest since irrigation problems were found to have direct, negative 
implications for the social support of children and the elderly in Ghana. Last- 
ly, and perhaps more controversially, the article suggests that rationality does 
not apply only to farming systems, to choices regarding cash crop production, 
but also to the construction of social networks. Given divergent sets of incen- 
tives, Ghanaians and Ivoirians prioritized different social ties in different ways. 
This article raises questions concerning other implications of the divergent 
structure of social networks. It reveals that the more diversified and horizon- 
tally oriented networks in Ghana ceased to effectively link the young and the 
old, and strained inter-generational solidarity. While this is clearly bad news for 
the long-term social security of the elderly in Ghana, what are the implications 
for the practice of politics? Most of the attention on the role of youth in Africa 
has focused on the phenomenon of "child soldiers," but the case presented here 
suggests the potential for a more positive role for youth, where their participa- 
tion may integrate political systems rather than disintegrate them. In Ghana, so- 
cial networks appear to connect individuals from different extended families, 
ethnic backgrounds, genders, and classes, whereas in CGte d'Ivoire ties are 
more concentrated within family systems of the same ethnicity, gender, and 
class. The more diversified ties of the Ghanaians might foster social ties across 
a broader range of groups, promoting broader political coalitions and support- 
ing enhanced political participation in decision-making-a sort of grassroots 
democracy. In CGte dlIvoire, by contrast, the more concentrated and vertical 
networks will most likely reinforce social and political exclusion, and hinder 
political participation and local democratic development. 
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